Conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) is one of the most prolific frameworks in the study of emotion concepts. Following the seminal work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and subsequent work by Kövecses (1986Kövecses ( , 1990 and Kövecses and Lakoff (1987), an impressive number of studies in cognitive linguistics and psycholinguistics have sought to document and confirm the claim that conceptual metaphor (CM) structures affective concepts. I attempt a brief overview of CMT claims about and CMT-inspired research on emotion concepts. I continue by presenting a study based on data collected in six languages, to assess the role of CM in the structuring of emotion concepts. I introduce the procedure, the corpus, and the analyses that have been carried out, including a detailed discussion of the considerations that informed the coding decisions applied to the corpus in a tentative quantitative analysis. Finally, I highlight a series of difficulties and controversies raised by CMT-driven analysis of emotion concepts that could be employed in hypothesis-driven experiments to test conceptual processing claims made within CMT.
INTRODUCTION

CMT: Claims on the Structuring of Emotion Concepts
According to one of CMT's foundational claims, emotion concepts are metaphorically structured: …Although a sharply delineated conceptual structure for space emerges from our perceptualmotor functioning, no sharply defined conceptual structure for the emotions emerges from our emotional functioning alone…. Metaphors allow us to conceptualize our emotions in more sharply defined terms.
CMT posits that only a few basic domains and concrete concepts emerge directly from bodily experience: e.g., spatial orientation, containment, force, and temperature. All abstract conceptsincluding emotion concepts -are indirectly grounded in these basic domains by sets of enduring metaphorical mappings, whose purpose is to assist understanding the more abstract concepts in terms of the more concrete ones (Kövecses 2000: 4) .
In CMT's most radical claims, metaphorical representation is automatic and obligatory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1993) , being the structuring principle for much of one's conceptual system: one's concepts and activities (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 7) . CMT researchers insistently claim that, by overlooking figurative language, alternative approaches to emotion concepts overlook what is arguably the most important source for understanding the structure of emotion concepts. These approaches were harshly criticized by Kövecses for relying on biased eliciting methods such as self reporting and questionnaires. CMT focused instead on 'local vocabularies': a methodological decision intended to lead to unbiased reconstruction of 'culturally defined emotion concepts' so that 'antecedents, cognitions, subjective feelings, physiological and behavioural responses, control mechanisms… associated with emotion all find their natural place within the same model' -contrary to the 'often one-sided attempts in our theorizing about emotion' (Kövecses 1990: 5) that produce a 'gross oversimplification and a complete distortion of our experiences' (Kövecses 1990:15) of any given emotion. CMT scrutiny of local vocabularies extracts the 'most common and important emotional experiences of a community' allowing for 'a better fit… between the way we conceptualize emotions… and what we experience when in some emotional state' (Kövecses 1990: 214 ).
CMT's introspective methodology begins with the analyst's intuitions on how people talk about various emotions so as to obtain an inventory of linguistic metaphors. The next step assesses metaphor systematicity by identifying source domains, classifying the examples accordingly, and extracting the underlying mappings or CMs. In the process, one may optionally identify the master-CM, as it has been termed by Kövecses: a CM that captures many aspects of the concept and is highly elaborated in terms of its metaphorical entailments and conventionalized vocabulary. Finally, one may optionally propose experiential motivations for the CMs identified.
Since a number of emotions are said to be basic and universal -the precise number and inventory varies, however, from one researcher to another -and since the bodily constraints invoked as motivating the CMs that structure emotion concepts are universal, one might expect that some mappings are likewise universal. Starting with CMT's second decade, the introspective approach was applied cross-culturally to assess the universality of various mappings and master metaphors. Among the best documented is the structuring of the concept of anger in terms of the metaphor ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER, following the seminal study in (Kövecses 1986) . Mappings consistent with this metaphor have been proposed for several unrelated languages such as Chinese (Yu 1995) , Hungarian (Kövecses 2000), Japanese (Matsuki 1995) , Polish (Mikolajczuk 1998 ), Spanish (Soriano Salinas 2003 , Tunisian Arabic (Maalej 2004) , and Zulu (Taylor & Mbense 1998) . The crosslinguistic evidence has been interpreted as indicative of cross-cultural conceptual consistency: 'the short answer to the question of why emotion concepts in diverse cultures share a basic structure is that the cultures also share a central metaphor that informs and structures the concepts (i. e., the folk understandings). This is the CONTAINER metaphor' (Kövecses 2000: 146) .
Kövecses proposes also an alternative master metaphor that constrains people's universal ways of understanding emotions: EMOTION IS FORCE. This universal CM is an entailment of the conceptualization of emotions as causes, which in turn is entailed by the fact that, in the EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff, 1993) , causes are conceptualized as forces. In this respect, emotions are conceptualized as forces (with instantiations such as fire, natural forces, etc.) that bring about certain responses. From this master-CM a consistent and systematic conceptualization is said to emerge, that distinguishes the emotion domain from other domains (e.g. rational thought, relationships, etc.). Moreover, due to the FORCE metaphor, it would be impossible to conceptualize most aspects of emotion concepts in other than metaphorical terms (Kövecses, 2000:85) .
CMT's introspective methodology has been criticized for being inherently eclectic and opportunistic, making it difficult to assess whether the lists of posited mappings are either complete or representative of how people talk and reason about emotions. Meanwhile, an exclusive concern with confirmatory evidence makes it difficult to draw any credible generalizations. This is especially true of cross-linguistic CMT studies, which appear to be less interested in emotion concepts as such, focusing instead on verifying the presence in a given language of certain mappings, which sometimes requires slight internal reorganizations of the assumed mappings. Since, by definition, the introspective approach relies on decontextualized examples, no systematic confrontation of metaphorical vs. nonmetaphorical language -as employed in actual conversation or reasoning about emotional experience -and no systematic assessment of CM's role in structuring emotion concepts across contexts and types of knowledge is carried out. This is even though in a self-report study -to take one example - Ortony and Fainsilber (1987) found two particular aspects of affective experience -subjective feeling and high intensity -more likely to be communicated by use of metaphors, both novel and frozen.
By the end of the '90s, corpus-based methodology began to be applied to CM studies of emotion concepts: e.g., (Deignan 1999) , which examines the use of the temperature lexis in the emotion domain. It has proven able to deal with some of the criticisms outlined above. As Stephanowitsch (2005) observes, it allows CM data to be examined and quantified more systematically and generalizations to be drawn about the significance of various source domains and mappings for a given target concept. Meanwhile, Turker (2010) observes that, although she is able to identify mappings consistent with those assumed universal by previous studies -mainly looking at Lakoff and Kövecses -corpus-based frequency and productivity measures indicate that these are not the representative metaphors for the Korean concepts of sadness and happiness. She admits also that several of the identified mappings could better be analyzed as metonymies instead of metaphors.
Corpus-based methodologies allow well-established metaphors to be reanalyzed and their systematicity and significance reassessed. In the process, new insights may be gained on the preponderance of lexical classes or degrees of metaphoricity, 2 and the role of CM across contexts and interaction types can be assessed. In a series of studies, Beger (2011 , Beger & Jäkel 2009 ) compares counselling contexts to movies and academic discourse; consequently, she finds that the extent to which people employ metaphors when talking and reasoning about anger, love, and sadness vary with respect to discourse goal, discourse structure, and type of interaction. Across these various genres, metaphorical language appears to account for only a modest percentage of emotion-specific talk: 9.8-15.6% of the emotional language used by experts and 8.1-20.9% of that employed by lay people.
Corpus-based CMT studies can still be criticized for circularity, since CMT's representational claims rely exclusively on linguistic data. Such data can be misleading: linguistic patterns may not reflect conceptual updating. Even though people continue to speak of the sun 'setting' and 'rising', that does not mean they continue to reason in a geocentric way; it testifies instead to a dissociation between lexicalization and conceptualization (Ortony 1988: 103 , presented in large fonts (Meier et al. 2008) , or confirmed by finger press of a key rather than foot press of a pedal (Meier & Hauser 2008) . Similar effects have been found with respect to memory processing (Crawford et al. 2006; Casasanto and Dijkstra, 2010) and attention (Meier & Robinson 2006. Even though these correlational findings show a clear and consistent association of affect and physical dimensions, it is debatable whether they should be taken as evidence of CM, since they are consistent with predictions made by any situated or embodied approach to cognition and most theories of learning. When the focus is on testing the role of specific mappings in structuring specific emotion concepts -rather than the generic mapping of affect onto physical dimensions as described abovethe evidence remains inconclusive, either confirming (e.g., Gibbs 1992 Gibbs , 2006 or failing to confirm (e.g., Glucksberg & McGlone 1993 Haenggi et al. 1994; McGlone 1996; Keysar et al.2000) CMT's predictions. 
METHODOLOGY
The corpus
Choice of eliciting categories
Since the purpose of the study was to access lay persons' concepts of emotions through language, it was important first to identify the relevant superordinate category or categories in the affective domain. From the perspective of functional equivalence, these should be part of the active lexicon native speakers commonly employ in everyday interactions and be those eliciting exemplars such as anger, fear, and love. Back translation, superordinate category production, as well as consultation of native speakers and dictionaries (see Sauciuc, 2012 for a more detailed description of the procedure)
were employed in order to ensure the functional equivalence of eliciting categories across languages.
Solutions found to be convergent across these sources were then retained for the purposes of data 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Data analysis: General considerations
I approached the data from the perspective of a researcher interested in emotion concepts in general and the role that CM plays in their structuring in particular. Data analysis was carried out in two stages: qualitative and exploratory analysis (Section 3.2) followed by tentative quantitative treatment of the 475 responses. The data was stored, coded, and analyzed using the software QDA Miner from Provalis Research. 
Stage One: Qualitative analysis
Responses were carefully read several times and analyzed for the themes / types of knowledge respondents mentioned more readily when explicitly asked to consult their concept of emotion, and for the strategies they employed in accessing this knowledge. Preliminary examination of the data indicated a great degree of systematicity in the responses, both within and across data sets. Three broad strategies for accessing affective knowledge emerged: taxonomic, gestalt and partonomic. Using the taxonomic strategy, respondents responded by accessing knowledge relating to hierarchical class inclusion and then providing a more generic category -state, state of mind, state of soul, phenomenon, etc. -for the eliciting superordinate category. Using the gestalt strategy, respondents responded by approaching emotion concepts as holistic entities characterized by generic valence or arousal properties, or by opposing emotional experiences conceived holistically to other kinds of experiences.
Finally, using the partonomic strategy, respondents accessed emotion concepts by selectively focusing on particular components of an emotional response: antecedents, physiological activations, behavioural responses, mentalizing and cognitive biases, etc. It was interesting to note the ease with which respondents switched from one strategy to another. This may be taken as indication that multiple strategies were used in structuring -what could be expected to be -modal concepts of emotion. The three strategies appear to correspond to different levels of abstractness of analysis, with the partonomic strategy operating at a more concrete level than the others. While respondents explicitly categorized affective experiences as states, an implicit categorization of these as processes emerged from their responses. This contrasts with Kövecses' claim (2000: 1) that lay persons categorize emotions as passions, while experts categorize them as actions or states.
Qualitative analysis was used to extract the kinds of affective knowledge reflected in the responses and then construct a code book (see Table 2 ). The code book was used to verify whether aspects of emotion knowledge are or are not more readily structured by CM (Section 3.4), since Gallese and Lakoff (2005) and Kövecses (2000) have claimed that only the most skeletal concepts of emotion can be constructed independently of metaphor.
Stage Two: Quantitative analysis
The general approach to coding and the main codes
In line with the commitment made in Section 3.1, both the CMT literature and alternative approaches to emotion concepts informed coding decisions. The CMT sources were examined for best practices from previous studies of emotion concepts (see Section 1.2), metaphor identification procedures, and reports on the interactions between metaphor and other structuring principles:
metonymy, IS, prototypes, and cognitive models. Non-CMT sources included alternative approaches to concepts in general and emotion concepts in particular. Besides theoretical considerations, I
examined the experimental evidence based on probabilistic, dimensional, theory-based, and alternative embodied models, as well as hybrid models. Finally, literature was consulted that reflects a graded view on embodiment of abstract thought: primarily relevant neuroscientific evidence on IS, spatial relations, and motion and action verbs. All these have been described in the CMT literature as instantiating physical domains that metaphorically structure emotion concepts. Given the questions that motivated the study, this approach -confronting CMT and alternative explanations of the same data rather than looking for confirmatory data -was deemed more profitable for assessing the plausibility that given instantiations of supposed mappings are indeed metaphorical, cross-domain mappings.
Corpus analysts have often pointed out that, when approaching natural language data for purposes of CMT analysis, it is very difficult to set reliable criteria for CM identification: 'an exhaustive annotation will confront the researcher with many cases that are not clear cut' (Stephanowitsch 2006: 10) . Instead of an all-inclusive approach as practiced by e.g. the Pragglejaz group, I have followed the advice of (Wallington et al. 2003) in considering it important to mark the certainty an annotator feels in annotating something as metaphorical. In my analysis, I applied the code M for metaphorical to cases that -in line with considerations that I will outline thoroughly in Section 3.3.2 -are plausible instances of CM and most likely to have direct conceptual implications. The code D was applied to those cases that were deemed debatable instances of CM.
I call this analysis tentative because its aim is by no means to provide any definitive answer to the question how many metaphors people use when consulting their emotion concepts. Indeed, no single set of empirical data could provide a definitive answer, given the many factors -individual cognitive style, mood, type of interaction and interactional goals, relationship with the interlocutor (to name just the most obvious) -likely to impact on the degree of metaphoricity of any given interaction, regardless of the cognitive domain in focus. Rather, the purpose of this investigation is to contribute to the debate on how to plausibly code for CM, taking into account evidence from and explanations proposed by alternative approaches to conceptualization. I also feel it important to identify recurrent cases that -in light of opposing evidence -may be seen as controversial, so as to gather a database of stimuli for more targeted hypothesis-driven testing of CM's role in structuring emotion conceptsfollowing e.g. the steps outlined in for the concept of time. The tasks I employed for purposes of data elicitation were never expected to maximize metaphorical language; instead, they were chosen for gaining access to the most salient types of knowledge structuring lay persons' emotion concepts at both a general and more basic level of abstractness. Such data should afford an assessment of whether any of these types of knowledge are either exclusively or primarily structured by metaphor.
Circumscribing the application of codes
Coding decisions were guided most directly by theoretical assumptions in, and examples provided by, CMT studies of emotion concepts. Although CMT has evolved continuously -incorporating new elements and perspectives -its fundamental claim remains that, through CM, concrete domains directly associated with sensorimotor experience and representation lend structure to abstract concepts, including emotion. Basicness, concreteness, and direct experience can thus be set as CM filter for assessing why emotion does not satisfy these requirements and supposed source domains do. I will discuss these criteria, beginning with experiential and ontogenetic basicness, continuing with the relationship between basicness and concreteness, and ending with semantic basicness. Before discussing semantic basicness, I introduce relevant coding decisions of a general character: relational language, event-related language, etc. I reserve discussion of coding decisions concerning single words for the section dedicated to semantic basicness. constitutes a more basic, more direct experience than emotion.
Ontogenetic basicness. When basicness is understood in terms of cognitive conceptual development, the common view is that infants possess spatial and motion concepts exclusively; they develop more abstract concepts only after they begin to acquire -or, more accurately, producelanguage, approximately by their third year. CMT invokes the ontogenetic basicness criterion in two more specific ways: in relation to the emergence of IS (next section) and in theoretical discussions of the theory of domain conflation in infancy (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1999) 5 . According to CMT, experiential domain bindings in infancy later, in the process of domain individuation, motivate metaphorical mappings in conceptualization.
5 Lakoff and Johnson (1999) where domain-specific details of e.g. agents and objects are lost before IS can be mapped onto language. Once abstracted, spatial relations become 'domain-less' relational structures. Texts where spatial vocabulary accomplishes such a relational function might be difficult to interpret as CM, given that CMT argues for the existence of mappings to specific source domains, from which rich knowledge is recruited in the conceptual processing of target domains.
Conceptual basicness and concreteness. Experiential or conceptual basicness is sometimes understood in terms of concreteness, itself understood in terms of compositionally simple, object-like properties. Objects perceived as simple gestalts, with their characteristic behaviour, are the preferred candidates for the basis of one's general conceptual system. The relevant point here concerns the plausibility of the EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor posited by Lakoff in his earlier works, widely 6 In one of the earliest definitions, an image schema is described as 'a recurring dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives coherence and structure to our experience.…'Experience' is to be understood in a very rich, broad sense as including basic perceptual, motorprogram, emotional, historical, social and linguistic dimensions' (Johnson 1987: xiv, xvi In psychology, the notion of event structure explains how, in perception, human beings break down the continuous flow of stimuli into smaller, more manipulable chunks reflected in their conceptualization of events (see e.g. Zacks & Tversky, 2001) . A great deal of evidence -including evidence from developmental psychology and comparative cognition -suggests a partonomic rather than metaphorical structuring of event-structure representations in a variety of conceptual tasks. Such is the case with the data presented here, which suggest that people predominantly access affective concepts partonomically (see Section 3.2 and Table 3 ) -focusing first and foremost on antecedents;
physiological, behavioural, cognitive, and phenomenological concomitants; and consequences of affective experience.
The special status of emotion concepts in relation to the concreteness criterion is confirmed by the special status of emotion words. Although generally judged to be abstract, experimental evidence shows that they are higher in imageability and context availability than other abstract words. They are faster to recall than both concrete and abstract words, and they rank highest in number of associated words (Altarriba, Bauer & Benvenuto 1999; Altarriba & Bauer 2004) . Emotional experience and vocabulary is posited (Vigliocco et al. 2010 , Prinz 2005 as an important source of semanticrepresentational structure for other domains. (2010) proposes a graded foundation for abstract thought, involving progressive disembodiment based on a shift in level of abstraction from analogue percept to digital language. This is consistent with the existence of three functional anatomical axes to neural processing: a left-right axis involving lateral differences in processing perceptually vs. lexically accessed sensorimotor information, a ventral-dorsal axis involving a representational shift from objects to relationships between objects, and a centripetal gradient from sensorimotor towards perisylvian cortices reflecting a transition from sensory information to more language-like content and finally to language proper.
IS and concreteness in the brain
Metaphor and lexical classes. The above evidence highlights the systematic processing differences between the concrete use of words and the abstract use of relational schemas, contra CMT predictions. Moreover, it highlights the heterogeneity of the CM construct. 7 The heterogeneity that is of interest here involves lexical classes 8 and the degree of metaphor conventionalization. Evidence points towards the differential processing of nominal metaphor -presumably supported by comparison and categorization (Bowdle & Gentner 2005) on the one hand, and verbal, prepositional and -to some extent -adjectival metaphor on the other. The latter might better be approached as the result of a progressive process of abstraction, whereby the concrete, sensorimotor features of a verb/preposition/adjective are stripped away, retaining only a few core conceptual attributes for metaphorical use (Bendny et al. 2008; Chatterjee 2008 Chatterjee , 2010 Chen et al. 2008; Wu et al. 2007) : an explicit mapping of one semantic domain onto another might not be needed (Schmidt et al. 2009 ).
Metaphor annotators observe that, while it is easy to identify source domains for nominal metaphors, it is difficult to establish them for adjectives, verbs, and prepositions.
Abstractness and degree of metaphoricity. Similar reasoning applies to evidence pointing to the differential processing of novel vs. conventional metaphor in a manner consistent with the career of metaphor theory (Bowdle & Gentner 2005) , which postulates a continuum from novel to familiar (conventional) to dead metaphor. Novel metaphor is processed by mapping the -most often relational -semantic attributes of one concept onto those of another. Conventional metaphor is processed by categorization. Schmidt and colleagues (2009: 3) show that -consistent with Chatterjee's (2010) proposal for functional neuroanatomic axes -most imaging studies employing conventional as opposed to novel metaphor fail to find right-hemisphere activation. One plausible explanation is that, as metaphors become familiar and categorized, they rely more on left-hemisphere lexical processes. In other words, the likelihood that source domains have conceptual implications for the processing of metaphorical language decreases with degree of conventionalization.
This lengthy discussion was necessary to account for the coding decisions made in this study with respect to spatial language when used with a relational function -often instantiated by event-related vocabulary such as 'originates', 'derives', 'happens', 'begins', 'ends', 'lasts', and 'causes'. I have generally coded this vocabulary as D (uncertain instances of CM) for several reasons. Developmental psychology and neural evidence on the one hand and CMT claims on the other appear to point -at 7 For more detailed discussion, see . 8 For a review, see (Martin, Ungerleider & Haxby 2000) .
least in some respects -in different directions. This vocabulary seems to provide an alternative means of expressing emotion-related knowledge that could be directly grounded in experience and acquired early in life. In most cases, it could be interpreted as instantiations of IS that can be incorporated directly into emotion concepts. The retrieval of a richly detailed source domain allowing for specific mappings is problematic. However, where a more specific source domain clearly was retrievable, I
coded the data as M.
Consider a verb that translates as 'give'. In contexts of abstract causation, I coded it D, since in those cases it appears to instantiate a highly abstract, schematic meaning detached from sensorimotor richness. However, in cases instantiating the transfer sense of the verb (e.g., one gives love), I coded it M. A similar situation arose for verbs of motion employed in a highly abstract, schematic mannere.g., instantiating a generic sense of 'originate' -without being reminiscent of any specific source domain.
Semantic basicness. Existing procedures from e.g. the Pragglejaz group (e.g. 2007) rely on semantic basicness, as reflected in lexicographic sources, to identify metaphorical words: an approach that, at first glance, seems to allow for more precise, clear-cut decisions. Although I have retained and employed the criterion of semantic basicness throughout this study, I have departed from the Pragglejaz group's procedure for several reasons, but primarily because of their explicitly stated lack of concern with conceptual processing implications and the intermediary steps by which linguistic data are transformed into a propositional format.
9
The criterion of semantic basicness, as reflected in lexicographic sources, may be misleading when employed as the only criterion for positing conceptual implications of metaphorical language. In some cases, this is due to dictionary limitations. Dictionaries are far less dynamic than other sources one might use: slower to incorporate new language usage or capture the changing state of what people feel to be more basic language use. In some cases, it might not even be possible to compare the situated meaning of a term with its dictionary-coded senses, perhaps because lay persons' intuitionswhich are expected to constrain processing -do not fit the dictionary entries.
One such case is the antonymic pair positive-negative used for referring to hedonic valence.
According to the basic dictionary-coded senses, these terms do not form an antonymic pair, and different source domains may be retrieved for them: e.g., epistemic vs. speech act. The basic sense of positive, coded by all dictionaries consulted, is 'certain, ascertained, demonstrated'; the basic sense of negative is 'negated, refused'. Yet, people's intuitions about the meaning and semantic development of these words tell a different story. In an informal experiment, native speakers were asked to arrange various senses of these words from what they thought were older, more basic uses to newer ones.
9 Although originally CMT approaches were not categorical on the format of conceptual representations underlying conceptual metaphor -allowing both propositional and imagistic implications -recent accounts claim a more direct relationship between linguistic expression and conceptual processing, perhaps mediated by simulation (Gibbs 2006 , Ritchie 2008 ). Thus, they might but might not be compatible with what I have done. Meanwhile, it remains unclear how, once propositionally coded, these representations are translated into nonpropositional formats: i.e., imagistic, embodied, amodal/supra-modal/multimodal, etc.
Respondents considered that the usage of 'positive' and 'negative' in domains such as mathematics, electricity, or temperature was primary and the generic sense of 'good', respectively 'bad' derived from the former.
It makes sense to expect that what is posited as a source domain needs to be active -or at least retrievable -to claim that the reason people employ a particular vocabulary specific to the source domain is motivated by the existence of metaphorical mappings. However, when source domains are not clearly available, it is difficult to interpret particular usages as testifying to metaphorical mappings based only on dictionary data. Meaning acquisition and ontogenetic enrichment of semantic structure need not reflect either historical semantic change or the order that senses are given in a dictionary. In consequence, positive-negative were always coded D for debatable.
A somewhat similar case is provided by the Romanian formulation a nutri sentimente: 'to nurture feelings'. Dictionary data suggests that the basic meaning of the verb a nutri is 'to feed, to eat', while 'to cultivate' is a derived figurative meaning in contexts where the object is an idea or feeling. At first glance, the formulation can be interpreted as a case of the metaphor EMOTIONS ARE LIVING Although, for a small number of speakers of Romanian, this example is plausibly classified as conventional metaphor; for the majority, the metaphor is dead.
11
A possible 'reverse' case is provided by the Romanian adjective profund ('profound'), whichunlike its Italian (profondo) and Castilian (profundo) counterparts -is a recent French loan word.
Lexicographic sources give the intellectual or affective domain as its basic scope and sense. For its Castilian and Italian counterparts, one might possibly retrieve a more basic domain in which the term is used; in Romanian, this is not the case. One might contend that the same basic domain can be retrieved via the synonymous adjective adânc ('deep'); however, despite their supposed synonymywhich is present in peoples' intuitions -the usage of the two adjectives seldom overlaps. Both appear to instantiate the same SCALE + CONTAINER complex schema, whose role in emotion concepts may not require metaphorical mediation. Pending further testing, these instances were also coded D for debatable.
In other cases -based on dictionary information alone -it is not possible to posit a source domain without resorting to theory-driven rationalization. One such case is the Romance-language adjective 'intense' -Romanian intens, Italian and Castilian intenso -to some degree used for referring to arousal as a characterizing dimension of the affective domain. Dictionaries may simply gloss this 10 Verbal tense, modality, and voice were all varied in combination with a wide variety of phrases from biology. 11 For a discussion of individual variation of degree of conventionality, see (Bowdle and Gentner 2005 Given that these nouns presently function as specialized nouns of experience, in would be interesting to test experimentally whether CMT's claims of conceptual processing can be confirmed, and whether the nouns can be treated uniformly across languages. 12 See Table One for the category codes. According to CMT, the non-metaphorical structure of emotion concepts is skeletal, so there is little one can say about emotion without resorting to metaphor. 13 It was interesting to check whether or not aspects of emotion knowledge were indeed more likely to be conceptualized metaphorically.
The Distribution of Codes
This was done using a code co-occurrence analysis: the main codes (coding for metaphor) against the secondary codes (Table Two) . For this purpose, a contrast main code was added: partonomy (P), coding for the accessing strategy that -according to the analysis reported in Section 3.2 -appeared to occur most frequently in the responses. Similarity indices were computed using Ochiai's coefficient, followed by a hierarchical cluster analysis, and a multidimensional scaling analysis for assessing the strength of the co-occurrence relationships. The strongest relationship to emerge was between partonomic access and references to cognitive correlates of emotion -e.g., intrusive thinking, memories, decision-making, etc. -followed by the co-occurrence of D with references to subjective feeling, including the use of verbs and nouns of experience, as well as hedonic valence. These are followed, in order, by relations between P-AF, P-Bh, P-SF, D-Cog, P-FZ, and D-DA (for codes, see Table Two ). The first relationship to involve M comes far down the list, linking M with SF, followed by M with IMP, Cog, CR, Loc, and DYN. Of all the relationships between M and secondary codes, IMP -coding for cultural and personal meaning -appears the strongest and the only one, apart MCogR, where a relationship is primarily established with M rather than D or P. Similarity indices (Table 3) , which express the strength of these relationships, indicate that metaphor is not prevalent with any of the knowledge types covered by the responses, with the exception of IMP. If further experiments provide evidence of conceptual metaphorical processing of the data coded D, then subjective feeling and degree of arousal might indeed be further knowledge types associated with metaphorical conceptualization -consistent with the findings in (Fainsilber & Ortony 1987) .
13 See the claims reviewed in sections 1.1 and 1.2. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The structuring role of CM in emotion concepts was assessed by qualitatively and quantitatively analyzing 475 responses obtained in a reasoning task that supplemented a free-listing task. Ten comparable sets of data were collected in six languages using the eliciting categories følelse and kjensle (Bokmål), følelse (Danish), känsla (Swedish), emoción and sentimiento (Castilian), emozione and sentimento (Italian), and emoţie and sentiment (Romanian). CM was found to account for only 3.7% of the collected data. A further 4.5% of the data was coded as debatably metaphorical, using the criteria outlined in Section 3.3.2. Since CMT claims that emotion concepts have only a skeletal nonmetaphorical conceptual structure -meaning that one can say little about emotions without resorting to metaphor (see sections 1.1 and 1.2) -it was interesting to test whether particular kinds of emotion knowledge are, indeed, more readily conceptualized metaphorically.
A number of secondary codes were derived based on the qualitative analysis reported in Section 3.2, to code for kinds of emotion knowledge. A code co-occurrence analysis -based on Ochiai's similarity indices, hierarchical clustering analysis, and multidimensional scaling analysis -was carried out to assess the strength of correspondence between the occurrence of metaphor and various kinds of affective knowledge. The results failed to find any strong correspondences, with the exception of references to personal or cultural meaning and, to a lesser extent, references to affect controlconsistent with the interpretation that metaphor is not necessary for constituting any aspect of emotion concepts, as claimed by CMT. Metaphor appears instead to enrich existing non-metaphorical structure.
Perhaps the use of metaphor is best accounted for by considering factors such as context and goals (Beger 2008 (Beger , 2009 (Beger , 2011 as well as needs for communicative expressiveness: the higher the need, the greater the amount of expected embodied simulation as basis for eliciting an empathic response in the audience.
14 Beyond the clear-cut cases of CM, 4,5% of the words produced in Task 1.3 were interpreted as potentially instantiating CMs. Based on the data -corroborated by secondary data of the kind described in Section 3.3.2 -it is not possible to make any strong conceptual processing claims.
However, by examining the data in light of both the CMT and non-CMT literature and the evidence they put forward, it is possible to collect a database of stimuli to be employed in targeted, hypothesisdriven studies to better assess the plausibility of interpreting these stimuli in terms of metaphorical conceptual processing. If claims of conceptual processing are confirmed then, based on the data reported here, subjective feeling and arousal may emerge as affective knowledge types that are largely structured by metaphor. The present study was an attempt to confront both CMT-based and alternative interpretations of the same data; but also an attempt to explore a possible integration of CMT-based and alternative approaches to emotion concepts, faithful to the assumption that each can benefit from the other.
